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Tweeting for Brexit: How social media 
shaped the Referendum campaign
Eurosceptic Twitter users outnumbered and out-tweeted pro-Europeans 
in the EU Referendum campaign, but were more confined into their 
own echo-chambers than Remainers. Max Hänska and Stefan Bauchowitz 
analysed 7.5m tweets and found the predominance of Euroscepticism on 
social media mirrored its dominance in the press.
Since the EU Referendum in June 2016, and even more so since Trump’s election 
victory in November, pundits have not tired of asserting the supposedly wide-
reaching influence of social media on our politics. It has been commonplace to 
speculate social media was a key conduit for misinformation, or ‘fake news’ more 
generally, that it confined citizens to echo chambers, that it may have been decisive 
in shaping the outcomes of the Referendum, and, indeed, the election of Donald 
Trump in the United States. There is no doubt social media have transformed 
our communication, how we access, and engage with information. It is also clear 
the mediated relationship between politicians, citizens, and journalists, how these 
groups communicate, engage with and relate to each other, has changed.
Consider the evidence on the increasing importance of social media as an 
information source. The Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report found that in 
2016 social media’s rise as a news source pulled even with print’s decline, both 
serving as a source of information for around 35 per cent of the UK’s public. 
After dedicated news sites, social media is the second most important place people 
discover news online (Newman et al 2016). A 2015 Ofcom report found 43 per 
cent of those who get news online, receive it through social media. The figure 
rises to 61 per cent among 16-24 year olds, 16 per cent of whom rely exclusively 
on social media for news (Ofcom 2017). Across the Reuters report’s 26 country 
sample, social media served as a news source for 51 per cent of its respondents, 
and as a main news source for 28 per cent of 18-24 year olds. But of course social 
media is not merely a channel for delivering news to audiences. Users share, post 
and comment on news, and can engage directly with politicians and journalists.
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It is hardly surprising news organisations increasingly use social media to reach 
audiences, and engage them. Journalists are fond of Twitter for sharing updates, 
particularly on ongoing stories. General research is also a staple Twitter use, allowing 
journalists to follow sources, and sometimes to crowd-source information. Those 
who are very active users also tend to be more audience-oriented than their less 
social media-active peers. And just as audiences can engage with journalists, given 
the multi-directional interactivity Twitter affords, journalists have also begun to 
seize social media as an opportunity to engage with audiences, to offer behind-
the-scenes views, gauge reactions, and build relationships. Some journalists also 
use Twitter to build a strong personal news brand, by displaying their professional 
values and practices, their ability to network and cultivate a community of followers 
(Hedman 2015). In doing so journalists are building direct relationships with their 
readers.
Twitter is also particularly popular among politicians. 87 per cent of British 
MPs have Twitter accounts. Of course Donald Trump’s use of Twitter as a primary 
means of reaching his followers is now notorious. But this is hardly surprising. As 
ever more citizens use social media, and as it becomes a more important source of 
information, it also becomes an obvious channel through which to reach them. 
To some extent politicians, like journalists, are cutting out intermediaries and 
reaching their audience directly.
Why does social media matter?
Evidently Twitter is an important part of the changing news ecosystem, through 
which politicians, journalists and citizens communicate and compete for eyeballs. 
Users are able to customise their informational environment, by selecting who 
they follow or engage with, a tendency amplified by social media algorithms which 
optimise users’ social feeds with content they may find congenial. However, on 
Twitter algorithms play only a small role, meaning partisan filtering of news is 
mostly down to the network of followers users create. Consequently, the social 
feed of an avid Eurosceptic would likely have been filled with stories about how 
inimical the EU was to British democracy, with confident assertions millions of 
pounds would be saved by leaving the EU, the NHS would benefit, and Remainers 
were scaremongering.
Perhaps most important, as noted above, social media disintermediates the 
diffusion of news and information, so traditional information intermediaries have 
seen their gate-keeping capacity diluted. In the past politicians and commentators 
needed to rely on news media to relay their messages to the general public. Now 
Farage’s or Trump’s tweets can reach millions directly, unadulterated by pesky 
journalists fact-checking and contextualising their message on the evening news. 
The increasing importance of social media as a source of news and information, its 
popularity with journalists and politicians, and the ways in which it changes the 
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ecosystem through which news is shared and accessed, make it crucial for us to 
understand its role in the UK’s EU Referendum.
How leave won Twitter
To map Twitter’s info-sphere, and examine how Eurosceptic (Leave) and pro-
European (Remain) activity compare on Twitter in the run-up to the referendum, 
we collected more than 7.5 million Brexit-related tweets in the month preceding 
the Referendum. We ask whether there was a relationship between Twitter activity 
and the actual vote, what kind of information was shared on Twitter, and whether 
Leavers and Remainers were confined to echo chambers which kept feeding them 
information congenial to their views, or whether the two sides engaged openly 
with one another.
It is clear from our analysis Twitter users who supported leaving the EU were 
more numerous, and Eurosceptic users in general were more active (they tweeted 
more frequently) than Remain users. We estimate Leave users were more numerous 
and more active on Twitter by a factor of 1.75-2.3. Other researchers examining 
Google search trends, Instagram posts and Facebook found similar patterns of 
Eurosceptic views being communicated with greater intensity by a greater number 
of users on those platforms (Herrman 2016, Polonski 2016).
We also found local authority districts with a greater share of Twitter users 
supporting Leave tended to vote for leaving the EU, so Twitter activity correlated 
with voting in the Referendum. This is not to say an analysis of Twitter activity 
could have predicted the Referendum. It is not clear how the Leave margin on 
Twitter should have been interpreted prior to the Referendum, even with such a 
robust observation of more pronounced Eurosceptic activity. After all, the factor 
by which Leavers outnumbered and out-tweeted Remainers on Twitter was much 
larger than the margin with which Leave won the vote. 
We also analysed the nature of openness and homophily on Twitter, which 
crucially affords users the ability to interact and engage with each other. To do 
so we examined the extent to which users who supported Leave and Remain 
interacted with each other, that is, for instance, whether a user who supported 
leaving the EU replied, quoted or retweeted a user who supported remaining in 
the EU. We found Leave users tended to be less open, and mostly engage with 
other Leave supporters, indicating important hallmarks of an echo-chamber. In 
contrast Remain supporters were much more open. Specifically, 83 per cent of 
interactions initiated by Leave supporters were with other Leave supporters. For 
Remain supporters this figure drops to 46 per cent. Remainers replied to, retweeted 
or quoted Leavers 49, 39 and 50 per cent of the time, respectively. Contrast this 
with Leavers who replied to, retweeted or quoted Remainers only 19, 8 and 11 per 
cent of the time, respectively.
This tendency to interact only with the like-minded is also reflected in the URLs 
shared. Leave users tended to share Eurosceptic domains, including The Express, 
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the Daily Mail, and Breitbart. But Leave users also linked more frequently to 
Bloomberg and Reuters than Remainers. Remain users tended to share links to The 
Guardian, BBC, The Independent, and less frequently The Mirror, The Financial 
Times, and The Economist. Overall, the most frequently linked domains were The 
Guardian, YouTube, BBC, and The Express. The prominence of The Express over 
the Daily Mail was somewhat surprising, given the latter is well known for running 
a hugely successful website which attracts around 29m monthly readers from the 
UK alone.
YouTube was the second most prominent domain linked, indicating the 
importance of video as a way of distributing information about the campaign. The 
single most shared video was to a clip of John Oliver’s comedy-news show Last 
Week Tonight which was supportive of remaining in the EU. Eurosceptic videos 
were numerous, but no single one rivalled the reach of John Oliver’s clip. Prominent 
Eurosceptic videos included ‘Brexit the Movie’ and other clips featuring, among 
others Toby Young, and Joseph Watson, who attempted to debunk ‘Project Fear’ 
and characterised the EU as a dictatorship by the bureaucratic gravy train.
Overall, Twitter users who supported leaving the EU were much more active and 
motivated in advancing their cause, than Remainers were in advocating continued 
EU membership. One possible explanation of the dominance Leavers achieved on 
Twitter may be that slogans such as ‘vote Leave’, ‘take control’, or even ‘Brexit’ were 
more suited to simple, soundbite messaging than the Remain campaign’s slogans 
and arguments (which is particularly useful given the character constraints of a 
tweet). Press coverage of the Referendum also favoured leaving the EU. Weighted 
for circulation, 82 per cent of newspaper articles in the lead-up to the Referendum 
supported leaving the EU, as other contributors to this book have noted (Deacon 
2016). The balance of Eurosceptic information, views and opinion on Twitter 
thus appear to be leaning in the same direction as the balance of information in 
the press, meaning both online and offline citizens were more likely to encounter 
Eurosceptic voices.
As social media changes the ways news and information is distributed, accessed 
and engaged with, we are forced to consider its implications for both journalism’s 
role in shaping public discourse, but also for the way media conveys information 
back-and-forth between citizens and the political system. How can people’s desire 
to engage and participate in the creation and distribution of information be 
reconciled with journalism’s role in making judgements about the importance and 
veracity of competing pieces of information? As the linear and hierarchical gate-
keeping structures which define the broadcast age have ever-less purchase on our 
evolving news and information ecosystems, the messy, multi-directional, bottom-
up practices of diffusing and absorbing information will play an ever-greater role 
in processes of public opinion formation.
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